

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

MAJORITY (202) 225-5074
MINORITY (202) 225-5051
<https://oversight.house.gov>

May 1, 2025

The Honorable Pete Hegseth
Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Hegseth:

The Democratic Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (“the Committee”) are conducting an investigation into Elon Musk, special government employee and senior adviser to President Donald Trump, and the extensive ties he has to China, Russia, and other foreign governments and officials.¹ Given the vast and growing number of government contracts awarded to Mr. Musk and his companies, including from the Department of Defense (DOD), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as the multiple conflicts of interest arising from them—the Democratic Members of the Committee are interested in whether he has fully disclosed all connections, interactions, payments, and business with foreign governments and officials.²

To assist us in this investigation, we request that you provide by May 15, 2025, all documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Department of Defense, regardless of origin, from January 1, 2015, to the present concerning:

1. Information provided by Elon Musk in response to Sections 9, 10, 19, 20A, 20B, 20C, and 23 in Form SF-86, and any other security clearance applications,

¹ See, e.g., *Musk’s China Business Ties Complicate His U.S. National Security Role*, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2025) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/21/musk-china-pentagon-national-security/); *How Elon Musk’s SpaceX Secretly Allows Investment from China*, ProPublica (Mar. 26, 2025) (online at <https://www.propublica.org/article/elon-musk-spacex-allows-china-investment-cayman-islands-secrecy>); *Elon Musk’s Secret Conversations with Vladimir Putin*, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 25, 2024) (online at www.wsj.com/world/russia/musk-putin-secret-conversations-37e1c187?mod=hp_lead_pos7); *Putin Envoy Says Russia Could Supply A Small Nuclear Power Plant for Musk’s Mars Mission*, Reuters (Mar. 27, 2025) (online at www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-envoy-says-russia-could-supply-small-nuclear-power-plant-musks-mars-2025-03-27/).


² *Elon Musk’s Business Empire is Built on \$38 billion in Government Funding*, Washington Post (Feb. 26, 2025) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2025/elon-musk-business-government-contracts-funding/); *Musk Is Positioned to Profit Off Billions in New Government Contracts*, New York Times (Mar. 23, 2025) (online at www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/us/politics/spacex-contracts-musk-doge-trump.html).

certifications, or materials, including those related to requests for periodic reinvestigation, and continuous vetting and continuous evaluation protocol;

2. Investigative and adjudicative files referring or relating to Guideline B—Foreign Influence, and Guideline C—Foreign Preference, associated with Elon Musk’s security clearances, certifications, periodic reinvestigations, and any vetting or evaluations for his positions;³
3. Documents concerning Elon Musk’s contacts with foreign nationals, including, but not limited to, any contacts formally disclosed by Elon Musk, and direct or indirect communications between Elon Musk and foreign government officials, representatives, affiliates, or agents;
4. Documents concerning any bids, responses to a request for proposals, tenders, or any other attempt, whether ultimately successful or not, by Elon Musk or any entity in which he holds an interest, to enter into a contract with any foreign governments, entities, or individuals;
5. Documents concerning business between Elon Musk or any entity in which he holds an interest with any foreign governments, entities, or individuals;
6. Documents concerning the receipt of funds by Elon Musk or any entity in which he holds an interest from any foreign source; and
7. Efforts by Elon Musk or any entity in which he holds an interest to obtain permission or approval for the direct or indirect receipt of payments from any foreign source.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Committee Democratic staff at (202) 225-5051. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Gerald E. Connolly
Ranking Member




Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress

³ See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines* (June 8, 2017) (online at www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/SEAD-4-Adjudicative-Guidelines-U.pdf).




Stephen F. Lynch
Member of Congress



Raja Krishnamoorthi
Member of Congress



Ro Khanna
Member of Congress



Kweisi Mfume
Member of Congress



Shontel M. Brown
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Melanie Stansbury
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Robert Garcia
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Maxwell A. Frost
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
Summer L. Lee
Member of Congress




Greg Casar
Member of Congress




Jasmine Crockett
Member of Congress




Emily Randall
Member of Congress



Suhas Subramanyam
Member of Congress



Yassamin Ansari
Member of Congress



Wesley Bell
Member of Congress



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Dave Min
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Ayanna Pressley
Member of Congress



Rashida Tlaib
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman

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May 1, 2025

The Honorable Kash Patel
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Patel:

The Democratic Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (“the Committee”) are conducting an investigation into Elon Musk, special government employee and senior adviser to President Donald Trump, and the extensive ties he has to China, Russia, and other foreign governments and officials.¹ Given the vast and growing number of government contracts awarded to Mr. Musk and his companies, including from the Department of Defense (DOD), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as the multiple conflicts of interest arising from them—the Democratic Members of the Committee are interested in whether he has fully disclosed all connections, interactions, payments, and business with foreign governments and officials.²

To assist us in this investigation, we request that you provide by May 15, 2025, all documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, regardless of origin, from January 1, 2015, to the present concerning:

1. Information provided by Elon Musk in response to Sections 9, 10, 19, 20A, 20B, 20C, and 23 in Form SF-86, and any other security clearance applications, certifications, or materials, including those related to requests for periodic reinvestigation, and continuous vetting and continuous evaluation protocol;


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² *Elon Musk’s Business Empire is Built on \$38 billion in Government Funding*, Washington Post (Feb. 26, 2025) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2025/elon-musk-business-government-contracts-funding/); *Musk Is Positioned to Profit Off Billions in New Government Contracts*, New York Times (Mar. 23, 2025) (online at www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/us/politics/spacex-contracts-musk-doge-trump.html).

2. Investigative and adjudicative files referring or relating to Guideline B—Foreign Influence, and Guideline C—Foreign Preference, associated with Elon Musk’s security clearances, certifications, periodic reinvestigations, and any vetting or evaluations for his positions;³
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6. Documents concerning the receipt of funds by Elon Musk or any entity in which he holds an interest from any foreign source; and
7. Efforts by Elon Musk or any entity in which he holds an interest to obtain permission or approval for the direct or indirect receipt of payments from any foreign source.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Committee Democratic staff at (202) 225-5051. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Gerald E. Connolly
Ranking Member




Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress

³ See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines* (June 8, 2017) (online at www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/SEAD-4-Adjudicative-Guidelines-U.pdf).




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Ro Khanna
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
Summer L. Lee
Member of Congress




Greg Casar
Member of Congress




Jasmine Crockett
Member of Congress




Emily Randall
Member of Congress



Suhas Subramanyam
Member of Congress




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Member of Congress



Ayanna Pressley
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Rashida Tlaib
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman

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May 1, 2025

The Honorable Tulsi Gabbard
Director
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
1500 Tysons McLean Drive
McLean, VA 22102

Dear Director Gabbard:

The Democratic Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (“the Committee”) are conducting an investigation into Elon Musk, special government employee and senior adviser to President Donald Trump, and the extensive ties he has to China, Russia, and other foreign governments and officials.¹ Given the vast and growing number of government contracts awarded to Mr. Musk and his companies, including from the Department of Defense (DOD), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as the multiple conflicts of interest arising from them—the Democratic Members of the Committee are interested in whether he has fully disclosed all connections, interactions, payments, and business with foreign governments and officials.²

To assist us in this investigation, we request that you provide by May 15, 2025, all documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, regardless of origin, from January 1, 2015, to the present concerning:

1. Information provided by Elon Musk in response to Sections 9, 10, 19, 20A, 20B, 20C, and 23 in Form SF-86, and any other security clearance applications,

¹ See, e.g., *Musk’s China Business Ties Complicate His U.S. National Security Role*, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2025) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/21/musk-china-pentagon-national-security/); *How Elon Musk’s SpaceX Secretly Allows Investment from China*, ProPublica (Mar. 26, 2025) (online at <https://www.propublica.org/article/elon-musk-spacex-allows-china-investment-cayman-islands-secrecy>); *Elon Musk’s Secret Conversations with Vladimir Putin*, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 25, 2024) (online at www.wsj.com/world/russia/musk-putin-secret-conversations-37e1c187?mod=hp_lead_pos7); *Putin Envoy Says Russia Could Supply A Small Nuclear Power Plant for Musk’s Mars Mission*, Reuters (Mar. 27, 2025) (online at www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-envoy-says-russia-could-supply-small-nuclear-power-plant-musks-mars-2025-03-27/).

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certifications, or materials, including those related to requests for periodic reinvestigation, and continuous vetting and continuous evaluation protocol;

2. Investigative and adjudicative files referring or relating to Guideline B—Foreign Influence, and Guideline C—Foreign Preference, associated with Elon Musk’s security clearances, certifications, periodic reinvestigations, and any vetting or evaluations for his positions;³
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Sincerely,


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
Gerald E. Connolly
Ranking Member



Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress




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
Greg Casar
Member of Congress



Jasmine Crockett
Member of Congress




Emily Randall
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Rashida Tlaib
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

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WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

MAJORITY (202) 225-5074
MINORITY (202) 225-5051
<https://oversight.house.gov>

May 1, 2025

The Honorable Susan Wiles
Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Wiles:

The Democratic Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (“the Committee”) are conducting an investigation into Elon Musk, special government employee and senior adviser to President Donald Trump, and the extensive ties he has to China, Russia, and other foreign governments and officials.¹ Given the vast and growing number of government contracts awarded to Mr. Musk and his companies, including from the Department of Defense (DOD), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as the multiple conflicts of interest arising from them—the Democratic Members of the Committee are interested in whether he has fully disclosed all connections, interactions, payments, and business with foreign governments and officials.²

To assist us in this investigation, we request that you provide by May 15, 2025, all documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Executive Office of the President, including the White House Security Office and the National Security Council, regardless of origin, from January 1, 2015, to the present concerning:

1. Information provided by Elon Musk in response to Sections 19, 20A, 20B, and 20C in Form SF-86, and any other security clearance applications, certifications, or materials, including those related to requests for periodic reinvestigation, and continuous vetting and continuous evaluation protocol;


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Sincerely,



Gerald E. Connolly
Ranking Member




Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress

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
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
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
Greg Casar
Member of Congress




Jasmine Crockett
Member of Congress




Emily Randall
Member of Congress



Suhas Subramanyam
Member of Congress




Yassamin Ansari
Member of Congress



Wesley Bell
Member of Congress



Lateefah Simon
Member of Congress



Dave Min
Member of Congress



Ayanna Pressley
Member of Congress



Rashida Tlaib
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman