

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

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February 6, 2025

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Treasury Office of Inspector General
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Norbert E. Vint
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Robert C. Erickson
Deputy Inspector General
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Deputy Inspector General
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Washington, D.C. 20416

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Deputy Inspector General
ED Office of Inspector General
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20202

The Honorable Paul K. Martin
Inspector General
USAID Office of the Inspector General
1016 16th Street N.W. Unit 400
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Deputy Inspectors General Scieurba, Vint, Erickson, Shoemaker, and Rocque and Inspector General Martin:

We are writing to express urgent concerns regarding recent reports that unauthorized individuals have gained access to protected government networks and sensitive, potentially classified data, including at the Department of the Treasury, the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).¹ It appears that similar initiatives are soon to be under way at the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Department of Education (ED).² These reports raise

¹ *Elon Musk's Friends Have Infiltrated Another Government Agency*, Wired (Jan. 31, 2025) (online at www.wired.com/story/elon-musk-lackeys-general-services-administration/); *Elon Musk's Team Now Has Access to Treasury's Payments Systems*, New York Times (Feb. 1, 2025) (online at www.nytimes.com/2025/02/01/us/politics/elon-musk-doge-federal-payments-system.html); *USAID Security Leaders on Leave After Trying to Keep Musk's DOGE from Classified Info, Officials Say*, AP News (Feb. 2, 2025) (online at <https://apnews.com/article/doge-musk-trump-classified-information-usaid-security-35101dee28a766e0d9705e0d47958611>); *Musk Aides Lock Workers Out of OPM Computer Systems*, Reuters (Feb. 2, 2025) (online at www.reuters.com/world/us/musk-aides-lock-government-workers-out-computer-systems-us-agency-sources-say-2025-01-31/).

² *Elon Musk is Barreling into Government with DOGE, Raising Unusual Legal Questions*, NPR (Feb. 3, 2025) (online at www.npr.org/2025/02/03/nx-s1-5285539/doge-musk-usaid-trump).

serious questions about the security protocols in place to safeguard sensitive government information and the potential for unauthorized access and misuse by private citizens without requisite clearance or any legitimate reason to access this information. Given the scope of these concerns, we strongly encourage you to coordinate across the inspector general community to address these potential threats to national security.

President Trump's Executive Order renaming the U.S. Digital Service as the U.S. DOGE Service lays out specific parameters within which the "DOGE teams" are to operate.³ There has been no public transition of the U.S. Digital Service to the new mission, nor has there been a public communication about the appointment of an Administrator of the U.S. DOGE Service.⁴ Although Elon Musk appears to have been granted the status of "Special Government Employee", there is no evidence that he, or any of his associates working under the "DOGE team" moniker are entitled to access our government systems, nor is there any evidence that they have undergone the proper vetting to ensure the security of taxpayer and government data.⁵

Mr. Musk and his team appear to have inserted themselves into the most sensitive data in the federal government. For example, recent reporting details how a civil servant at the Department of Treasury who has served presidents of both political parties over the course of his 35-year career, voiced concerns about granting Mr. Musk and his team access to the government's payments systems.⁶ This dedicated civil servant was reportedly placed on administrative leave due to his opposition and subsequently announced his retirement.⁷ Mr. Musk and his team now have access to the payment system which serves our government's checkbook and is responsible for distributing trillions of dollars, including: federal employee salaries; Social Security payments; Medicare benefits; tax refunds; funding for federal grants; and payments to government contractors.⁸ This system holds some of the most sensitive personal data for millions of Americans and it now appears that people outside of the government that lack a legitimate rationale to have access have been granted access.

³ The White House, *Establishing and Implementing the President's "Department of Government Efficiency"* (Jan. 20, 2025) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/establishing-and-implementing-the-presidents-department-of-government-efficiency/).

⁴ As of February 3, 2025, the USDS website still offers information on the U.S. Digital Service and provides no insight into any newly appointed Administrator of the Service. See: <https://www.usds.gov/>. (Accessed Feb. 4, 2025)

⁵ *Elon Musk is a 'special government employee' What does that mean?*, Washington Post (Feb. 4, 2025) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/02/04/elon-musk-special-government-employee-meaning/).

⁶ *Elon Musk's Team Now Has Access to Treasury's Payments Systems*, New York Times (Feb. 1, 2025) (online at www.nytimes.com/2025/02/01/us/politics/elon-musk-doge-federal-payments-system.html); *Treasury Official Quits After Resisting Musk's Requests on Payments*, New York Times (Jan. 31, 2025) (online at www.nytimes.com/2025/01/31/us/politics/david-lebryk-treasury-resigns-musk.html).

⁷ *Treasury Official Quits After Resisting Musk's Requests on Payments*, New York Times (Jan. 31, 2025) (online at www.nytimes.com/2025/01/31/us/politics/david-lebryk-treasury-resigns-musk.html).

⁸ *Senior U.S. Official Exits After Rift with Musk Allies Over Payment System*, Washington Post (Jan. 31, 2025) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/01/31/elon-musk-treasury-department-payment-systems/).

There is substantial reporting that unauthorized individuals have accessed systems and classified data at other agencies, including USAID and OPM. Mr. Musk and his team reportedly had a confrontation with security officials at USAID. The security officials believed they were “legally obligated to deny access” to unauthorized officials associated with Mr. Musk as part of their duty to protect classified information.⁹ The Musk team’s intrusion at OPM also raises serious questions about the security of the personal information of hundreds of thousands of government employees.¹⁰ Current officials at OPM reportedly, “have no visibility into what [potentially unauthorized individuals] are doing with the computer and data systems.” OPM officials added, “there is no oversight. It creates real cybersecurity and hacking implications.”¹¹ Networks at GSA, SBA, and ED appear to be targets for Musk and his team as well.¹²

We are deeply concerned that unauthorized system access could be occurring across the federal government and could pose a major threat to the personal privacy of all Americans and to the national security of our nation.

Offices of Inspectors General are more important than ever. Congress and the American people rely on you to remain dogged and steadfast in your pursuit of truth without regard to political affiliation. As such, we urge you to fulfill your duties as non-partisan watchdogs, appropriately issue management alerts as relevant, and assess the potential security breaches across the federal government due to Mr. Musk and his teams’ actions. We further ask that you assess whether agencies followed appropriate protocol for conducting privacy impact assessments and provide answers to the following questions:

1. To what specific government networks have Elon Musk or any other individuals associated with him gained access, and what is the nature of the information contained within those networks?
2. What is the stated justification for granting these individuals such access, and what legal authority permits this access?
3. What security protocols were followed in granting this access to ensure that Americans will not have their personal data compromised and that national security remains protected, and what measures are in place to monitor these individuals’ activities within these networks?

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Musk Aides Lock Workers Out of OPM Computer Systems*, Reuters (Feb. 2, 2025) (online at www.reuters.com/world/us/musk-aides-lock-government-workers-out-computer-systems-us-agency-sources-say-2025-01-31/).

¹¹ *Id.*


¹² *Elon Musk’s Friends Have Infiltrated Another Government Agency*, Wired (Jan. 31, 2025) (online at www.wired.com/story/elon-musk-lackeys-general-services-administration/); *Elon Musk is Barreling into Government with DOGE, Raising Unusual Legal Questions*, NPR (Feb. 3, 2025) (online at <https://www.npr.org/2025/02/03/nx-s1-5285539/doge-musk-usaid-trump>).

4. What is the duration of these individuals' access, and what is the process for revoking or terminating their access?
5. What is the potential risk to national security and the privacy of American citizens as a result of their access?


The American people deserve transparency and accountability when it comes to the security of their government's networks and the protection of sensitive information.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate "any matter" at "any time" under House Rule X. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Committee Democratic staff at (202) 225-5051.


Sincerely,




Gerald E. Connolly
Ranking Member




Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress




Stephen F. Lynch
Member of Congress




Raja Krishnamoorthi
Member of Congress




Ro Khanna
Member of Congress




Kweisi Mfume
Member of Congress



Shontel M. Brown
Member of Congress



Melanie A. Stansbury
Member of Congress



Robert Garcia
Member of Congress




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Greg Casar
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Jasmine Crockett
Member of Congress



Emily Randall
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Sunas Subramanyam
Member of Congress




Yassamin Ansari
Member of Congress




Wesley Bell
Member of Congress



Lateefah Simon
Member of Congress



Dave Min
Member of Congress



Ayanna Pressley
Member of Congress



Rashida Tlaib
Member of Congress

Deputy Inspectors General Sciurba, Vint, Erickson, Shoemaker, and Rocque and Inspector General Martin
Page 6

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman