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(Original	Signature	of Member	)

116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION



To direct the Transportation Security Administration to carry out covert testing and risk mitigation improvement of aviation security operations, and for other purposes.

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. CUMMINGS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

## A BILL

- To direct the Transportation Security Administration to carry out covert testing and risk mitigation improvement of aviation security operations, and for other purposes.
  - 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
  - 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

## **3** SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Covert Testing and
- 5 Risk Mitigation Improvement Act of 2019".

## 1 SEC. 2. TSA COVERT TESTING AND RISK MITIGATION IM 2 PROVEMENT.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,
5 the Administrator of the Transportation Security Admin6 istration shall implement the following:

7 (1) A system for conducting risk-informed 8 headquarters-based covert tests of aviation security 9 operations, including relating to airport passenger 10 and baggage security screening operations, that can 11 yield statistically valid data that can be used to iden-12 the tify and assess nature and extent of 13 vulnerabilities to such operations that are not miti-14 gated by current security practices. The Adminis-15 trator shall execute annually not fewer than three 16 risk-informed covert testing projects designed to 17 identify systemic vulnerabilities in the transportation 18 security system, and shall document the assumptions 19 and rationale guiding the selection of such projects.

20 (2) A long-term headquarters-based covert test21 ing program, employing static but risk-informed
22 threat vectors, designed to assess changes in overall
23 screening effectiveness.

24 (b) MITIGATION.—

25 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the
26 Transportation Security Administration shall estab-

1	lish a system to address and mitigate the
2	vulnerabilities identified and assessed pursuant to
3	the testing conducted under subsection (a).
4	(2) ANALYSIS.—Not later than 60 days after
5	the identification of any such vulnerability, the Ad-
6	ministrator shall ensure a vulnerability described in
7	paragraph (1) is analyzed to determine root causes.
8	(3) Determination.— Not later than 120
9	days after the identification of any such vulner-
10	ability, the Administrator shall make a determina-
11	tion regarding whether or not to mitigate such vul-
12	nerability. The Administrator shall prioritize miti-
13	gating vulnerabilities based on their ability to reduce
14	risk. If the Administrator determines—
15	(A) to not mitigate such vulnerability, the
16	Administrator shall document the reasons for
17	the decision; or
18	(B) to mitigate such vulnerability, the Ad-
19	ministrator shall establish and document—
20	(i) key milestones appropriate for the
21	level of effort required to so mitigate such
22	vulnerability; and
23	(ii) a date by which measures to so
24	mitigate such vulnerability shall be imple-

mented by the Transportation Security Ad ministration.

3 (4) RETESTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which measures to mitigate a vulner-4 5 ability are completed by the Transportation Security 6 Administration pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(ii), the 7 Administrator shall conduct a covert test in accord-8 ance with subsection (a) of the aviation security op-9 eration with respect to which such vulnerability was 10 identified to assess the effectiveness of such meas-11 ures to mitigate such vulnerability.

12 (c) COMPILATION OF LISTS.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 14 completing a covert testing protocol under sub-15 section (a), the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration shall compile a list (includ-16 17 classified annex if necessary) of ing a the 18 vulnerabilities identified and assessed pursuant to 19 such testing. Each such list shall contain, at a min-20 imum, the following:

21 (A) A brief description of the nature of
22 each vulnerability so identified and assessed.
23 (B) The date on which each vulnerability

24 was so identified and assessed.

1	(C) Key milestones appropriate for the
2	level of effort required to mitigate each vulner-
3	ability, as well as an indication of whether each
4	such milestone has been met.
5	(D) An indication of whether each vulner-
6	ability has been mitigated or reduced and, if so,
7	the date on which each such vulnerability was
8	so mitigated or reduced.
9	(E) If a vulnerability has not been fully
10	mitigated, the date by which the Administrator
11	shall so mitigate such vulnerability or a deter-
12	mination that it is not possible to fully mitigate
13	such vulnerability.
14	(F) The results of any subsequent covert
15	testing undertaken to assess whether mitigation
16	efforts have eliminated or reduced each vulner-
17	ability.
18	(2) Submission to congress.—The Adminis-
19	trator shall submit to the Committee on Homeland
20	Security of the House of Representatives and the
21	Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
22	tation of the Senate a comprehensive document
23	tracking the status of the information required
24	under paragraph (1) together with the Transpor-

- tation Security Administration's annual budget re quest.
- 3 (d) GAO REVIEW.—Not later than three years after 4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller 5 General of the United States shall review and submit to the Administrator of the Transportation Security Admin-6 7 istration and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 8 House of Representatives and the Committee on Com-9 merce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Admin-10 11 istration's processes for conducting covert testing projects that yield statistically valid data that can be used to assess 12 the nature and extent of vulnerabilities to aviation security 13 14 operations that are not effectively mitigated by current se-15 curity operations.