

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

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March 9, 2026

The Honorable Frank J. Bisignano
Commissioner
Social Security Administration
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235

Dear Mr. Bisignano:

Americans entrust the federal government with their sensitive personal information with the expectation—and legal guarantee—that it will be safeguarded according to federal cybersecurity, privacy, and information security laws. Yet a recent court filing from the Social Security Administration (SSA) corroborates whistleblower disclosures under investigation by Committee Democrats: Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) employees, embedded in SSA with President Donald Trump’s authorization, had access to Americans’ most sensitive data and engaged in the unauthorized, improper handling and sharing of this data. Any unauthorized use, manipulation, or sharing of government data derived from SSA would constitute a violation of multiple privacy and cybersecurity laws. Moreover, SSA lied to the court and failed to properly notify Congress of the potential leak and unsanctioned transmission of Americans’ data. Accordingly, I demand information regarding former DOGE employee access to and illegal disclosure of Americans’ Social Security data.

In August 2025, a whistleblower from SSA—former Chief Data Officer Charles Borges—came forward to report that DOGE operatives had accessed a database containing “the entire country’s Social Security information” and copied it to a high-risk external system potentially connected to sources outside SSA.¹ Mr. Borges also reported that SSA violated a March 20, 2025, court order barring DOGE operatives from continued access to the data. In his whistleblower disclosure, Mr. Borges outlined the “apparent systemic data security violations, uninhibited administrative access to highly sensitive production environments, and potential violations of internal SSA security protocols and federal privacy laws.”² Among other things, the

¹ Letter from Government Accountability Project to Chair Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Senate Committee on Finance, Chair James Comer and Ranking Member Robert Garcia, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chair Jason Smith and Ranking Member Richard E. Neal, House Ways and Means Committee, and Acting Special Counsel Jamieson Greer (Aug. 26, 2025) (online at <https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a9f2afd18a79e330/b181d62a-full.pdf>).

² Letter from Ranking Member Robert Garcia, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Ms. Michelle L. Anderson, Acting Inspector General for Audit Performing the Duties of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration (Sept. 23, 2025) (online at <https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2025-09->

disclosure alleged that SSA granted DOGE team members “new and expanded” access to SSA data on the evening of Friday, March 21, 2025—in direct violation of the court order—and did not revoke such access until March 24, 2025.³

In an apparent realization that SSA employees had lied to the federal court on this and other counts, the Department of Justice (DOJ) posted a series of “corrections” to prior statements SSA staff had made to the court.⁴ Among the updates, DOJ disclosed that a member of DOGE within SSA ran searches of Americans’ private information in SSA’s NUMIDENT database until approximately 9:30am on Monday, March 24, 2025, aligning with Mr. Borges’s allegations.⁵ These developments raise the unsettling question: **did someone explicitly grant DOGE this access to Americans’ private data over the weekend of March 21, 2025, and for what specific purpose?**

The amended court filing then states that DOGE’s “access to all PII within SSA systems” was terminated around noon on March 24, 2025, and points out that this occurred *before* the filing of a sworn statement by then-SSA Administrator Dudek that such access had been terminated as of that day.⁶ It appears that then-Administrator Dudek and his team may have been careful to delay the filing of his statement until after DOGE’s access to SSA data was fully revoked, raising concerns that they intentionally allowed for the violation of the court order until that point. It is also critical to investigate the other facts of this claim in Mr. Borges’s disclosure and, if true, the very plausible possibility that Mr. Dudek and other senior SSA officials were aware that DOGE was illegally granted access to Americans’ Social Security data over the span of a full weekend in March.

DOJ further disclosed that DOGE employees at SSA had covertly corresponded with “a political advocacy group” that sought to “overturn election results in certain States,” and that one of these DOGE members signed and sent a “Voter Data Agreement” to the group on March 24, 2025.⁷ *Notably, the amended filing reveals that this DOGE employee transmitted the Voter Data Agreement the same day that a DOGE employee was granted access to SSA’s data and system of*

22.garcia-to-ssa-oig-re-doge-whistleblower.pdf).

³ *Id.*

⁴ Notice of Corrections to the Record, (Jan. 16, 2026), *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Social Security Administration et al.* (Case No. 1:25-cv-00596-ELH) (online at <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321.197.0.pdf>).

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.*; Letter from Government Accountability Project to Chair Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Senate Committee on Finance, Chair James Comer and Ranking Member Robert Garcia, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chair Jason Smith and Ranking Member Richard E. Neal, House Ways and Means Committee, and Acting Special Counsel Jamieson Greer (Aug. 26, 2025) (online at <https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a9f2afd18a79e330/b181d62a-full.pdf>); Notice of Corrections to the Record, (Jan. 16, 2026), *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Social Security Administration et al.* (Case No. 1:25-cv-00596-ELH) (online at <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321.197.0.pdf>).

⁷ *Id.*

records in direct violation of the March 20th temporary restraining order—raising the question of whether these employees are the same individual and whether these actions are connected. Moreover, the DOGE operative allegedly signed the agreement without any apparent review or approval through normal agency procedures for data exchange. These revelations raise serious concerns as to whether DOGE shared Americans’ sensitive Social Security data with a non-governmental organization, jeopardizing the security of millions of Americans and for overtly political purposes.⁸

Also according to the filing, on March 3, 2025, an SSA DOGE team member sent an “encrypted and password-protected file that SSA believes contained SSA data” with personally identifiable information (PII) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a Senior Advisor to DOGE, and a DOGE-affiliated Department of Labor employee.⁹ SSA has not been able to open the file but believes that it contained “PII derived from an SSA system of record, including names and addresses of approximately 1,000 people.”¹⁰ This builds on previous allegations of DOGE’s misuse of data, including reportedly consolidating significant amounts of Americans’ sensitive data from SSA and the Internal Revenue Service to build a master surveillance database within DHS.¹¹ The Privacy Act prohibits interagency sharing of sensitive data without a system of records notice in place, and it appears no such notice was filed or provided to the Committee related to SSA’s amended court filing, potentially indicating 1,000 violations of the Privacy Act.¹²

The amended filing further confirmed that on April 9, 2025, a DOGE team member within SSA was granted access to a call center profile which allowed access to PII—in direct violation of the court order. The access was not revoked until June 11, 2025, and SSA was unable to identify the scope of actions taken by this team member. Another DOGE team member was granted access to PII profiles from March 26, 2025, to April 2, 2025, and although DOJ asserts that the access was never utilized, questions remain as to why it was granted in the first place. Additionally, the filing admits that DOGE violated SSA security policies by sharing data through the unauthorized third-party server “Cloudflare” and it remains unclear whether this data may have contained PII.¹³ Committee Democrats are appalled that SSA failed to notify our office of these unauthorized potential and confirmed breaches of sensitive government data.

⁸ *Id.*; *Trump Administration Concedes DOGE Team May Have Misused Social Security Data*, Politico (Jan. 20, 2026) (online at www.politico.com/news/2026/01/20/trump-musk-doge-social-security-00737245).

⁹ Notice of Corrections to the Record, (Jan. 16, 2026), *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Social Security Administration et al.* (Case No. 1:25-cv-00596-ELH) (online at <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321.197.0.pdf>).

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *DOGE is Building a Master Database to Surveil and Track Immigrants*, Wired (Apr. 18, 2025) (online at www.wired.com/story/doge-collecting-immigrant-data-surveil-track/).

¹² Social Security Administration, *Privacy Act Systems of Records Notices* (online at <https://www.ssa.gov/privacy/sorn.html>) (accessed Mar. 6, 2026).

¹³ *Id.*

The amended filing's corroboration of aspects of Mr. Borges's whistleblower allegations raises further alarms that other claims in his disclosure may also be true. For example, per Mr. Borges, DOGE members John Solly and Michael Russo sidestepped network security protocols meant to protect the NUMIDENT database, which contains records on every person issued a Social Security Number, and copied every American's sensitive Social Security data into an unsecure test cloud environment.¹⁴ If true, the Trump Administration may be responsible for the most significant data breach in the history of the federal government.

According to Mr. Borges, DOGE member and recently designated Chief Information Officer (CIO) Aram Moghaddassi received information from SSA Office of CIO career officials that copying the NUMIDENT database to this unsecure cloud environment would pose an extremely high risk, and the Office of Information Security determined that it would be impermissible to do so.¹⁵ Despite receiving this information, Mr. Moghaddassi allegedly authorized the operation anyway, stating, "I accept all risks[.]"¹⁶ If true, I am deeply concerned that this action violates the Federal Information Security Modernization Act, the Privacy Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—laws enacted by Congress to ensure the privacy and cybersecurity protection of Americans' sensitive data.¹⁷ It is imperative that we determine the facts, including whether any cloud environment or other external access to SSA data is still operational and how it has been used by DOGE members.

In addition to these alarming concerns, further whistleblower reporting alleges that at least one former DOGE member may remain in possession of sensitive SSA data and may even have ongoing remote administrative access to data sets within SSA.¹⁸ These allegations are extremely troubling and warrant immediate investigation, including into potential criminal wrongdoing.

Given the Trump Administration's demonstrated inability to protect the sensitive data with which Americans entrust SSA and refusal to account for its failures, I request that you provide a staff level briefing no later than March 23, 2026, related to DOGE's access to Americans' data, SSA's efforts to understand and make public the extent of this access, and any potential misuse, manipulation, or inappropriate sharing of that data. We also request that you provide the following documents and information by March 23, 2026:

¹⁴ Information provided to Committee Democratic Staff; Letter from Government Accountability Project to Chair Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Senate Committee on Finance, Chair James Comer and Ranking Member Robert Garcia, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chair Jason Smith and Ranking Member Richard E. Neal, House Ways and Means Committee, and Acting Special Counsel Jamieson Greer (Aug. 26, 2025) (online at <https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a9f2afd18a79e330/b181d62a-full.pdf>).

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 44 U.S.C. § 3553(b).


¹⁸ Whistleblower information received by Committee Democratic Staff.

1. All documents and information referring or relating to the activities of any DOGE member operating at SSA or requesting information of SSA, including but not limited to any DOGE member's access to, use of, manipulation of, or sharing of government data derived from SSA or any federal agency;
2. All documents and information referring or relating to the allegations in the August 6, 2025, internal disclosure by Chuck Borges;
3. All communications referring or relating to the August 6, 2025, internal disclosure by Chuck Borges;
4. Any internal analyses or reviews related to DOGE members' access, use, manipulation, or sharing of government data derived from SSA since January 20, 2025;
5. All internal analyses of ongoing data sharing outside SSA with former employees;
6. All signed voter data agreements involving any member of the U.S. DOGE Service or SSA in their personal or professional capacities, including any political or election advocacy group; and
7. All communications sent or received by any DOGE or SSA employee related to the access, use, manipulation, or sharing of government data derived from SSA since January 20, 2025, including but not limited to:
 - a. Aram Moghaddassi;
 - b. John Solly;
 - c. Edward Coristine;
 - d. Michael Russo;
 - e. Steve Davis;
 - f. Antonio Gracias; and
 - g. Payton Rehling.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate "any matter" at "any time" under House Rule X. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Committee Democratic staff at (202) 225-5051. Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

The Honorable Frank J. Bisignano
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Garcia", written over a horizontal line.

Robert Garcia
Ranking Member

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman