

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

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March 9, 2026

Ms. Michelle L. Anderson
Assistant Inspector General for Audit as First Assistant
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235

Dear Ms. Anderson:

Americans entrust the federal government with their sensitive personal information with the expectation—and legal guarantee—that it will be safeguarded according to federal cybersecurity, privacy, and information security laws. Yet a recent court filing from the Social Security Administration (SSA) corroborates whistleblower disclosures under investigation by Committee Democrats: Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) employees, embedded in SSA with President Donald Trump’s authorization, had access to Americans’ sensitive data in violation of court orders and engaged in the unauthorized, improper handling and likely illegal sharing of this data.¹ Any unauthorized use, manipulation, or sharing of government data derived from SSA would constitute a violation of multiple privacy and cybersecurity laws. Moreover, SSA lied to the court and failed to properly notify Congress of the potential leak and unsanctioned transmission of Americans’ data. Accordingly, I demand that you conduct a comprehensive investigation regarding former DOGE employee access to and misuse of Americans’ Social Security data.

In August 2025, a whistleblower from SSA—former Chief Data Officer Charles Borges—came forward to report that DOGE operatives had accessed a database containing “the entire country’s Social Security information” and copied it to a high-risk external system potentially connected to external sources outside SSA.² Mr. Borges also reported that SSA violated a March 20, 2025, court order barring DOGE members from continued access to the data. In his whistleblower disclosure, Mr. Borges outlined the “apparent systemic data security violations, uninhibited administrative access to highly sensitive production environments, and

¹ *Trump Administration Concedes DOGE Team May Have Misused Social Security Data*, Politico (Jan. 20, 2026) (online at www.politico.com/news/2026/01/20/trump-musk-doge-social-security-00737245).

² Letter from Government Accountability Project to Chair Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Senate Committee on Finance, Chair James Comer and Ranking Member Robert Garcia, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chair Jason Smith and Ranking Member Richard E. Neal, House Committee on Ways and Means, and Acting Special Counsel Jamieson Greer (Aug. 26, 2025) (online at <https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a9f2afd18a79e330/b181d62a-full.pdf>).

potential violations of internal SSA security protocols and federal privacy laws.” Among other things, the disclosure alleged that SSA granted DOGE team members “new and expanded” access to SSA data on the evening of Friday, March 21, 2025—in direct violation of the court order—and did not revoke such access until March 24, 2025.³

In an apparent realization that SSA employees had lied to the federal court, the Department of Justice (DOJ) posted a series of “corrections” to prior statements SSA staff had made to the court.⁴ This filing, when compared to Mr. Borges’s whistleblower complaint and more recent whistleblower allegations, raises far more questions than it answers, including:

1. **What did DOGE do with Americans’ private data when it illegally accessed Social Security systems after the court ordered it to stop?** Although a temporary restraining order was issued by a judge on March 20, 2025, DOJ disclosed that a DOGE member within SSA ran searches of Americans’ private information in SSA’s NUMIDENT database until approximately 9:30am on Monday, March 24, 2025,⁵ aligning with Mr. Borges’s allegations. These developments raise the unsettling question: did someone explicitly grant DOGE new and expanded access to Americans’ private data over the weekend of March 21, 2025, in violation of the court order, and for what specific purpose?
2. **Did DOGE hand every American’s private, sensitive Social Security data to a partisan interest group for overtly political purposes?** Among the updates made to the court, DOJ disclosed that DOGE employees at SSA had covertly corresponded with “a political advocacy group” that sought to “overturn election results in certain states,” and that a “Voter Data Agreement” was signed and sent to the group on March 24, 2025.⁶ *Notably, the DOGE employees transmitted the Voter Data Agreement the same day that they were granted access to SSA’s data and system of records in direct violation of the March 20, 2025, temporary restraining order.* Moreover, DOGE operatives allegedly signed the agreement without any apparent review or approval through normal agency procedures for data exchange. These revelations raise serious concerns as to whether DOGE shared Americans’ sensitive Social Security data with a non-governmental organization, jeopardizing the security of millions of Americans and for overtly political purposes.⁷

³ *Id.*

⁴ Notice of Corrections to the Record, (Jan. 16, 2026), *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Social Security Administration et al.* (Case No. 1:25-cv-00596-ELH) (online at <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321.197.0.pdf>).

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*; *Trump Administration Concedes DOGE Team May Have Misused Social Security Data*, Politico (Jan. 20, 2026) (online at www.politico.com/news/2026/01/20/trump-musk-doge-social-security-00737245).

3. **Did DOGE violate federal law by making a copy of every American’s private Social Security data and uploading it to an unsecure platform?** Per Mr. Borges, DOGE member John Solly attempted to sidestep network security protocols to replicate the NUMIDENT database onto a cloud environment. Despite receiving information from SSA Office of Chief Information Officer (CIO) career officials that copying every American’s sensitive data into this cloud environment would be extremely high risk, and an Office of Information Security determination that it would be impermissible to move this data to a test cloud environment, DOGE member and new CIO Aram Moghaddassi allegedly authorized this operation, stating, “I accept all risks[.]”⁸ If true, I am concerned that this action violates the Privacy Act, Federal Information Security Modernization Act, and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—laws enacted by Congress to ensure the privacy and cybersecurity protection of Americans’ sensitive data.⁹ It is imperative that we determine the facts, including whether any cloud environment or other external access to SSA data is still operational and how it has been used by DOGE members.
4. **Did DOGE steal a copy of every American’s private Social Security data for personal use? Is a private citizen currently in possession of such information on a thumb drive and able to remotely access Americans’ Social Security data through capabilities set up by DOGE?** I understand that your office is in possession of additional whistleblower disclosures and request ongoing updates on the status of this investigation, including what other law enforcement entities may be involved in the investigation.
5. **Why did DOGE send 1,000 people’s Social Security data to DHS?** According to the filing, on March 3, 2025, an SSA DOGE team member sent an “encrypted and password-protected file that SSA believes contained SSA data” with personally identifiable information (PII) to the Department of Homeland Security, a Senior Advisor to DOGE, and a DOGE-affiliated Department of Labor employee.¹⁰ SSA has not been able to open the file but believes that it contained “PII derived from SSA’s systems of record, including names and addresses of approximately 1,000 people.” The Privacy Act prohibits interagency sharing of sensitive data without a system of records notice in place, and it appears no such notice was filed, potentially indicating 1,000 violations of the Privacy Act.

⁸ Letter from Government Accountability Project to Chair Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Senate Committee on Finance, Chair James Comer and Ranking Member Robert Garcia, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chair Jason Smith and Ranking Member Richard E. Neal, House Committee on Ways and Means, and Acting Special Counsel Jamieson Greer (Aug. 26, 2025) (online at <https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a9f2afd18a79e330/b181d62a-full.pdf>).

⁹ 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 44 U.S.C. § 3553(b).

¹⁰ Notice of Corrections to the Record, (Jan. 16, 2026), *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Social Security Administration et al.* (Case No. 1:25-cv-00596-ELH) (online at <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321/gov.uscourts.mdd.577321.197.0.pdf>).

6. **Why did SSA grant DOGE access to Americans' private data in violation of court orders?** The amended filing confirmed that on April 9, 2025, a DOGE team member within SSA was granted access to a call center profile which allowed access to PII—in direct violation of the court order. The access was not revoked until June 11, 2025, and SSA was unable to identify the scope of actions taken by this team member.¹¹ Another DOGE team member was granted access to PII profiles from March 26, 2025, to April 2, 2025, and although DOJ asserts that the access was never utilized, questions remain as to why DOGE was granted this access in the first place.

On April 17, 2025, then-Ranking Member Gerald E. Connolly sent a letter to your office raising concerns that Mr. Borges's whistleblower disclosure, combined with public reporting, indicated that DOGE was rapidly, haphazardly, and unlawfully working to implement changes that could disrupt Social Security payments and expose Americans' sensitive data.¹² Your office replied on November 25, 2025, stating that “[f]or efficiency, and to avoid duplicate effort, SSA OIG will monitor the GAO engagement [of DOGE access to SSA systems] and request updates if GAO identifies significant issues of which we need to be aware.”¹³

In fact, SSA OIG is required to conduct “independent oversight of SSA’s programs and operations,” including investigations of criminal matters—actions which GAO normally refers to agency Offices of Inspector General or the appropriate law investigative entity. These significant and urgent potential security risks demand an immediate investigation from an Inspector General. And, although your office has confirmed the existence of an investigation regarding more recent whistleblower allegations, it is essential that SSA OIG conduct a comprehensive investigation of these and any related claims—including those of Mr. Borges—to ensure the security of this critical data and maintain the independence and integrity of your office.¹⁴

Committee Democrats also expect timely and accurate information regarding SSA OIG’s treatment of whistleblower complaints. It is unacceptable that your office has refused to schedule a meeting with Committee Democrats despite repeated and urgent requests.

Given the Trump Administration’s demonstrated inability to adequately protect the sensitive data with which Americans entrust SSA and refusal to account for its failures, I request

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² Letter from Ranking Member Gerald E. Connolly, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Michelle L. Anderson, Social Security Administration Office of Inspector General (Apr. 17, 2025) (online at https://ismg-cdn.nyc3.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/asset_files/external/2025-04-17gec-to-ssa-oig-master-data.pdf).

¹³ Letter from Michelle L. Anderson, Social Security Administration Office of Inspector General, to Ranking Member Robert Garcia, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Nov. 25, 2025) (online at <https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2025-09-22.garcia-to-ssa-oig-re-doge-whistleblower.pdf>).

¹⁴ Letter from Michelle L. Anderson, Social Security Administration Office of Inspector General, to Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Senate Committee on Finance, Chair Jason Smith and Ranking Member Richard Neal, House Committee on Ways and Means, Chair Rand Paul and Ranking Member Gary Peters, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Chair James Comer and Ranking Member Robert Garcia, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Mar. 6, 2026) (on file with the Committee).


Ms. Michelle L. Anderson

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that you provide a briefing to the Committee related to the potential unauthorized access, use, manipulation, exfiltration, or sharing of government data derived from SSA as of January 20, 2025. Please arrange a time for a briefing with Committee staff no later than March 23, 2026, to confirm the scope of your ongoing investigation and detail your commitment to communicate its findings promptly.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Committee Democratic staff at (202) 225-5051. Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R. Garcia', written over a horizontal line.

Robert Garcia
Ranking Member

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chairman